The Afterguard

Jack,

If you had the power, there is a task that I would ask you to take on that needs to be done. The following quote, from the August 2002 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News, is attributed to the new Maritime Administrator, Wm. G. Schubert:

“Everyone knows that our shipyards need to identify
vessel designs that they can build in series in
sufficient numbers to reach adequate economies of
scale. The Kvaerner Philadelphia Shipyard with its
container vessel design. I believe this can be done
with other vessel designs and I am up for the
challenge.”

Bill Schubert sounds like a shipbuilding industry lobbyist of the 70s and 80s. His words suggest that the Maritime Administration never created the government/industry National Shipbuilding Research Program and that the paper “Interim Products – An Essential Innovation in Shipyards,” was never published in the August 1985 issue of the Journal of Ship Production.

What I wish that you could do is spank Bill until he can perfectly recite, “Ships of the same kind built in series are not a panacea for lagging productivity. The solution is more fundamental and imaginative. The solution involves a rethinking of an entire shipbuilding system. The world’s most productive shipbuilders employ standard series interim products made possible by a production system that classifies parts, subassemblies and assemblies by the problems inherent in their manufacture. The result is highly rationalized design modules and highly organized work. Such interim products are flexible enough to be parts of many sizes and types of ships. Runs of such interim products, not ships, is the key!”

Also, because he was a Kings Point deckie, I wish that you could make him write that quote a hundred times.

Lou

Tom Swift wrote:

Until there are real market forces driving the US shipbuilding industry, it will continue to do what makes the most money: inefficient, politically driven make work programs.

Lou Chirillo wrote:

Avast Tom Swift! You’re thinking like a landlubber. U.S. shipbuilding yards are indispensable elements of U.S. sea power! While I agree with your comment, it serves no useful purpose unless it is accompanied by a proposed solution.

You and I, and other concerned Americans, should strive to educate influential people, e.g., representatives, senators, prime-time TV commentators, newspaper columnists; and Navy, Maritime Administration and Coast Guard officials, about the difference between competitiveness and effectiveness. At this I time, I believe that the South Korean shipbuilding industry is the most competitive and, as European shipbuilders tell us, due to massive subsidies by the South Korean Government. At the same time I believe that the Japanese shipbuilding industry is the most effective, i.e., the most efficient. The Japanese shipyard management systems employ less human effort for the same output.

The prospect of the Chinese shipbuilding industry overtaking the South Korean’s in competitiveness in the next decade or two, is realistic. That means that the U.S. shipbuilding industry, barring an innovation miracle, cannot exist in the foreseeable future amidst real-market forces.

Certain de-facto subsidies, such as, limiting the construction of naval ships to U.S. shipyards, are necessary in order to maintain U.S. sea power. However, as taxpayers we have the right to demand that the U.S. shipyards that receive such largess, de facto or not, maintain a proven level of efficiency relative to the world’s best.

Tom Swift wrote:

It seems to me that the nation that invented the clipper ship, the nuclear submarine, and the container ship would be able to maintain its innovative advantage. Consider that the clipper ship and the container ship were driven by economic incentives.

But look at where the innovation is coming from on the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS). The Raytheon team is developing on the Norwegian Skjold surface effect ship, the Bath team is using the trimaran design developed by the British, and the Lockheed team is designing around relatively conventional fast patrol boats. All of the players are outsourcing to foreign firms for systems and components.

For rapid deployment, the Army (not the Navy) leased an Incat fast ferry, and for non-nuclear submarines, the US had to buy into the German shipbuilders. Oh, and then there is NASSCO that is taking advantage of opportunities to set up shops across the border in Mexico.

Finally, given the MHC-51 debacle (estimated at $70M each and being delivered 5 years late and at $270M each), maybe we should look to getting best value: let the government buy ships on the international market.

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